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Thursday, June 30, 2016

Building the F-22C "Super Raptor": Intro & Backgrounder - Part I

UPDATE: Part II Will Be Published the Week of July 25th-31st


Image 1: F-22 design evolution. Image Credit: Lockheed Martin retrieved via Code One Magazine.  
Table of Contents
  1. Intro: Air Superiority 2030 – A Non-Traditional Approach– Part I
  2. Backgrounder: Fleet Composition & Upgrades – Part I
  3. F-22A Deficiencies to Correct 
  4. F-22C Enhancements
  5. Fleet Options & Building the F-22C Super Raptor
  6. F-22C Strategic Impacts and Implications
  7. Conclusion

Intro: Air Superiority 2030 – A Non-Traditional Approach       

In recent months, the remarks of both senior USAF officials and service strategy documents depict a fluid and increasingly questionable approach to conceptualizing, let alone developing, an F-22 replacement. The latest iteration of the F-22 replacement was revealed in June 2016 with the publication of “Air Superiority Flight Plan 2030” which calls for a “penetrating counter air (PCA)” aircraft:
The Air Force must reject thinking focused on ‘next generation’ platforms…Such focus often creates a desire to push technology limits within the confines of a formal program…Capability development efforts for PCA will focus on maximizing tradeoffs between range, payload, survivability, lethality, affordability, and supportability. While PCA capability will certainly have a role in targeting and engaging, it also has a significant role as a node in the network, providing data from its penetrating sensors to enable employment using either stand-off or stand-in weapons. As part of this effort, the Air Force should proceed with a formal AoA in 2017 for a PCA capability.[1] [emphasis added]
Notably absent from the PCA description is maneuverability, the defining characteristic of fighter aircraft for the past century. The description of the PCA is an evolution of earlier USAF remarks which emphasize the service’s desire to develop a non-traditional systems of systems approach to air superiority in the 2030s to the replace the F-22. The study was led by Colonel Alex Grynkewich, a former F-22 pilot, who believes the USAF must invest in high payload-long range capable systems paired with unmanned assets such as the loyal wingman; Colonel Grynkewich discourages using the term “sixth generation” to describe the PCA.[2][3]


Image 2: Current 6th generation technology development efforts detailed by the Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL). Some of these technologies can be integrated into the F-22 which will be discussed in subsequent articles. Image Credit: John ‘Beach’ Wilcox Director AFRL Munitions Directorate 

            Lt. General Holmes, Deputy Chief of Staff for Strategic Plans and Requirements, has been a vocal proponent of a SoS approach with respect to replacing the F-22. This SoS approach would be much more minimalistic in the sense that it would not necessarily produce a sixth generation F-X aircraft. Instead, it would produce several technologies within a shorter time period i.e. 2025 which could be integrated into existing platforms or deployed from modular purpose-built platforms as part of a wider SoS architecture.   
‘F-X would have been most likely like a sixth-generation fighter and would have had a 20 or 30-year development programme,’ Holmes said at an Air Force Association forum in Washington DC on 7 April. ‘What we want to try to do is solve the problem faster than that by looking out across the range of options and building what we’re capable of building instead of waiting for the next generation’.[4]
Given the growing traction of those who seek to develop and integrate sixth generation technologies into existing platforms and field new operational concepts in lieu of developing a new fighter (or substantially delaying a 6th generation F-X as a result of upgrades), the option to restart F-22 production merits further consideration. Congressman Randy Forbes (R-VA), Chairman of the Seapower and Projection Forces Subcommittee within the House Armed Services Committee, added a provision within the House version of the proposed 2017 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) which would order the Air Force to study the costs of restarting F-22 production with a goal of 194 additional airframes; the added 194 would enable the USAF to meet its prior requirement for 381 airframes.[5] While its widely recognized Congressman Forbes likely added the provision to bolster his reelection campaign, which he recently lost the primary for, this article will examine how the USAF could plausibly add additional capabilities to the F-22 fleet via the development of an F-22C “Super Raptor”.

Backgrounder: Fleet Composition & Upgrades [Updated 7/4/16] 

            Prior to an analysis of the F-22C and its additional capabilities, a brief overview of the current state of the USAF F-22 fleet is necessary to provide a contextual background. The F-22 program has survived a series of tumultuous political and bureaucratic challenges which have terminated additional procurement, realigned basing, and altered modernization plans. With a national security calculus which put a greater emphasis on non-state actors over great power threats, Congress curtailed F-22 production in 2009 to just 195 airframes of which 187 were delivered to the USAF; Of those 187 airframes, only 123 are currently deployed to active combat capable units as primary mission aircraft inventory (PMAI) airframes. The following is a chart provided by Air Combat Command (ACC) which details the current F-22 fleet by base and inventory type. ACC figures account for write-offs, i.e. crashes, but the two test configured F-22As at Edwards AFB, CA are not included by ACC as they are under USAF Materiel Command’s 411th FTS. Thus, the current active F-22 inventory is 183 airframes of all types.


Image 3: Source: ACC A589/8XX, 15 January 2014. Retrieved via “Air Superiority by the Numbers: Cutting Combat Air Forces in a Time of Uncertainty”, pp. 21, Major Taylor T. Ferrell, 2014.



Image 4: “Aerospace Vehicle Programming, Assignment, Distribution, Accounting, and Termination”, pp. 33, 2013.  

The USAF had planned to operate 381 F-22As of which 240 would be PMAI status thereby evenly forming 10 fighter squadrons (FS). Standard USAF fighter squadrons generally consist of 24 PAI aircraft and 2 BAI designated airframes; BAI aircraft are still assigned to active squadrons but are often temporarily undergoing programmed depot maintenance (PDM) prior to rotating back into the PMAI fleet such that another two PMAI airframes become BAI and undergo depot maintenance.[6]  The 123 PAI airframes, roughly half of the earlier USAF requirement, were originally divided into smaller squadrons of between 18 and 21 PAI aircraft accompanied by 2 BAI airframes.[7]  As a result of financial pressures, the F-22 fleet underwent a major realignment in 2011 which was completed in 2014 in which both the 7th and 8th FS at Holloman AFB, NM were reassigned to Joint Base (JB) Elmendorf-Richardson, Tyndall AFB, Nellis AFB, and JB Langley-Eustis. An effort was made to consolidate the newest and most capable F-22As, namely Block 30 and Block 35 airframes, at Elmendorf and Langley while older airframes were assigned to JB Pearl-Hickam and Tyndall such that fleet capabilities are evenly spread between the East and West Coasts.[8]
The largest non-PMAI airframe contingent of F-22As is based at Tyndall AFB within the Tyndall Schoolhouse. These 31 Block 20 configured F-22As assigned to the 43d FS and are utilized to train new Raptor pilots. The next largest contingent of non-PMAI airframes resides at Nellis AFB, NV which are utilized for test and evaluation roles as well the formation of new techniques, tactics, and procedures (TTP) by the 422d test and evaluation squadron (TES) and 433d weapons squadron (WS) respectively; Nellis’ F-22As feature a diverse mix of Block 20, 30, and 35 airframes.[9]
In 2010, the USAF planned to upgrade 149 F-22As with Increment 3.1 capabilities bringing them to the Block 30 standard; 87 of these 149 airframes were to be upgraded further with Increment 3.2 capabilities such that the final PAI and BAI composition would consist of 63 Block 30, 87 Block 35, and 35 Block 20 F-22As. It’s important to note two write-offs have occurred since 2010 including 1 43d FS Block 20 at Tyndall and 1 Block 30 at Elmendorf within the 525th FS.[10] The total cost of the Increment series of upgrades is $6.9 billion with all F-22 improvement programs through 2023 budgeted at $11.3 billion, 60% of these funds were spent prior to FY 2014. 
            In 2012, Government Accountability Office (GAO) documents show that the USAF plans to bring 143 F-22As to the Block 35 standard with full Increment 3.2 upgrades at a total cost of $1.5653 billion and a unit cost of $10.298 million per airframe.[11] These 143 airframes likely consist of 123 PMAI aircraft as well as those squadron’s accompanied 12 BAIs airframes and the remaining 8 airframes would plausibly be assigned to Nellis for TES or USAF Weapons School roles. Major F-22 upgrade programs are detailed below, the upgrades are generally understood to be associated with the following Block designations:
  • Increment 2.0 = Block 20 – earlier airframes upgraded to this baseline
  • Increment 3.1 = Block 30
  • Increment 3.2 = Block 35
In addition to the upgrade programs below, the F-22 is receiving additional upgrades through the Increment 3.2 follow-on, “Budget Program Activity Code [BPAC]: 674788 – F-22 Tactical Mandates” which consists of Update 5 and Update 6.



Image 5: GAO vs USAF description of F-22 modernization effort components retrieved via CRS. Auto GCAS capability has been withdrawn from the Increment 3.2 upgrade and is now featured within the Update 5 software modification. Much more detailed examination of F-22 upgrades is available here:  http://manglermuldoon.blogspot.com/2014/03/the-uncertain-future-of-americas.html

The F-22 Tactical Mandates series of software upgrades have three principal objectives: reduce the risk of fratricide, improve fourth-to-fifth generation communication, and complete risk reduction measures for the Increment 3.2B upgrade via partial integration of the AIM-9X.[12] The most substantial Tactical Mandates components not listed under either Update 5 or Update 6 are Link-16 transmit capability and Identification friend or foe (IFF) mode 5 integration. A total of 72 F-22As will receive Link-16 transmit capability by 2020; the distribution of these 72 aircraft among the PMAI squadrons and the nature of the Link-16 modification, i.e. use of L-3 developed “Chameleon” waveform to reduce probability of detection, have not been specified. [13] In the interim period prior to the 2020 Link-16 upgrade, Raptor pilots will continue to utilize a series of ad-hoc operational procedures to share information over UHF and VHF radio with 4th generation pilots when there are no Battlefield Airborne Communications Node (BACN) aircraft is not present; Update 5 modified aircraft will also be able to utilize the Intra-Flight Data Link (IFDL) GWY Mode as a means to communicate with 4th generation aircraft.[14][15]  
            In 2014, pilots from the 422d TES tested the Scorpion helmet mounted cueing system (HMCS) for integration with the F-22. However, the Scorpion was ultimately not funded as the Air Force was struggling to fund Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) mandated items such as mode 5 IFF as part of the Tactical Mandates program.[16] While integration of a HMCS or helmet mounted display (HMD) may seem of greater utility to F-22 combat capabilities than IFF upgrades, aircraft than have not featured the latest available IFF standard have often been relegated to subordinate roles or have had to adhere to strict rules of engagement which greatly diminish the capabilities of their aircraft. For example, F-4 Phantoms often struggled to identify distant radar contacts in the early years of the Vietnam War such that full use of the Phantom’s beyond visual range (BVR) capabilities was not realized until the fielding of the APX-80 IFF in 1972.  



Image 6: BAE PowerPoint slide showing contract award for AN/DPX-7 transponder integration into the F-22. TACAN = Tactical Air Navigation, ADS-B = Automatic Dependent Surveillance – Broadcast, M5L2 = Mode 5 Level 2 – Broadcast. Image Credit: BAE systems.  

The APX-80 IFF was developed under the “Combat Tree” program in which the U.S. covertly acquired Soviet SRO-2 IFFs from Arab MiGs downed during the Six Day War. APX-80 equipped Phantoms enabled pilots to not only recognize friendly IFF contacts, but also to definitely recognize adversary aircraft at BVR.[17] Similarly, U.S. Navy F-14As participating in the alpha strike against Tammuz AB during the opening hours of the Persian Gulf War lacked electronic identification capabilities. Tomcat pilots had to follow strict rules of engagement, “F-14s were not allowed to sweep ahead of the US Navy strike packages (except for the far west H3 area). Instead they were relegated to close escort of the relatively defenseless carrier-based aircraft”.[18] Despite the fact that the F-14 arguably had the greatest BVR capabilities of any Coalition aircraft during the Persian Gulf War as a result of the AWG-9 and APG-71 radars (for the A and D models respectively) and AIM-54 Phoenix missile, it was effectively relegated to within visual range (WVR) roles thereby greatly diminishing the capabilities of the aircraft. Ensuing the F-22 is not sidelined in a future conflict for fear of fratricide, is well worth delaying the integration of an HMD which is now scheduled for 2021.[19]
The Update 5 software modification component of the Tactical Mandates program is actively being integrated within the F-22 fleet, “The Update 5 Operation Flight Program (OFP) includes Automatic Ground Collision Avoidance System (AGCAS), Intra Flight Data Link Mode 5th to 4th generation IFDL capability (IFDL GWY Mode), and basic to Block I AIM-9X missile launch capability".[20] Full integration of the more capable AIM-9X Block II requires Increment 3.2B upgrades which prove two-way datalink functionality between the F-22 and AIM-9X Block II thereby enabling lock-after launch (LOAL) capability. Furthermore, the symbology, possibly the weapons engagement zone (WEZ), for the AIM-9X is displayed with AIM-9M characteristics on the F-22’s HUD under the Update 5 modification. Increment 3.2B will rectify the symbology issues but is not scheduled to incorporate a HMD which facilitate AIM-9X HOBS. However, Raptor pilots will still be able to fully utilize the AIM-9X’s increased range and maneuverability enhancements over the AIM-9M as a result of the Update 5 modification. While the AIM-9X integration component of Update 5 is significant, the AGCAS capability is critical to mitigating the potential of future write-offs within the small F-22 fleet; the Update 5 modification also improves general software stability.
Image 7: The 525th FS based JB Elmendorf-Richardson Alaska have received the Update 5 modification. Image Credit; John Dibbs, Code One Magazine, 2015. 

Update 6 appears to be geared towards both denying potential adversaries a source of signals intelligence and bolstering the cyber security, and possibly the resilience of, of Link-16 and IFDL:

U6 will develop, test and field new capabilities and capability enhancements including changes driven by real world evolving threats, emergency/safety of flight issues, and deficiency reports. U6 Interoperability provides cryptographic updates required by the National Security Agency (NSA) to IFDL, Link-16, and Tactical Secure Voice (TSV) and development to maintain interoperability with the enhancements to Link-16 and Secure Voice networks. The U6 Interoperability program will absorb and build upon the development work already accomplished in the KOV-20 Cryptographic Modernization Program and integrate that development into a single Operational Flight Program (OFP) for fleet release. In addition, U6 Interoperability will develop and deliver software fixes identified as critical to the operational community. - Exhibit R-2, RDT&E Budget Item Justification: PB 2016 Air Force - PE 0207138F: F, 2015.[22] [Emphasis added]

While the current F-22 modernization program represents a holistic approach to increasing the combat capabilities of the fleet with respect to suppression of enemy air defense (SEAD)/destruction of enemy air defense (DEAD) roles, augmenting the F-22’s already formidable beyond visual range (BVR) and within visual range (WVR) capabilities, and improving 4th to 5th generation compatibility – planned upgrades to not remedy deeper design deficiencies within the F-22A. While the F-22 is unambiguously the most lethal air-to-air platform in existence, the F-22 was designed during the 1980s and 1990s under a different threat and technological environment. Namely the F-22’s antiquated internal computing capabilities, software, high maintenance requirements, and limited combat radius degrade the utility of the F-22 within the context of operating in the Asia-Pacific against increasingly capable great power threats. Part II will examine these deficiencies further in preparation for an analysis of what features an F-22C could include which would both correct these shortcomings and add new capabilities to the F-22 airframe.

Works Cited


[2] “USAF Ordered to Look At Raptor Production Restart”, Combat Aircraft, Volume 17 –Issue 6, pp.8, June 2016.
[3] “Don’t Call it ‘Sixth Gen’, John A. Tirpak, Air Force Magazine, and April 2016.  http://www.airforcemag.com/DRArchive/Pages/2016/April%202016/April%2008%202016/Don%E2%80%99t-Call-it-%E2%80%9CSixth-Gen%E2%80%9D.aspx
[4] “USAF backs off sixth-gen 'fighter' in quest for air supremacy “, James Drew, April 2016. https://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/usaf-backs-off-sixth-gen-fighter-in-quest-for-air-423994/
[5] “Facing Election Fight, Forbes Pushes F-22 Revival”, Lara Seligman, April 2016. http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/air-space/2016/04/21/facing-election-fight-forbes-pushes-f-22-revival/83352746/
[6] “Air Superiority By The Numbers: Cutting Combat Air Forces in A Time of Uncertainty”, Major Taylor T. Ferrell, June 2014.
[7] “F-22 Raptor Deployment”, Global Security, last modified January 2016. http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/aircraft/f-22-deploy.htm
[9] “422d TES Order of Battle”, Aviamagazine, last visited June 2016. http://www.aviamagazine.com/factsheets/orbat/422TES/index.aspx
[10] “USAF debates major upgrade for F-22 Raptors”, Stephen Trimble, August 2010. https://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/usaf-debates-major-upgrade-for-f-22-raptors-345808/
[11] DEFENSE ACQUISITIONS Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs, “F-22 Increment 3.2B Modernization (F-22 Inc 3.2B Mod)”, pp. 137-138, March 2016. http://www.gao.gov/assets/680/676281.pdf
[12] “Exhibit R-2, RDT&E Budget Item Justification: PB 2016 Air Force - PE 0207138F: F”, USAF, 2015. http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/budget/fy2016/usaf-peds/0207138f_7_pb_2016.pdf
[13] “Critical Ingredient In Short Supply”, John A. Tirpak, March 2016. http://www.airforcemag.com/MagazineArchive/Documents/2016/March%202016/0316f22.pdf
[14] “Exhibit R-2, RDT&E Budget Item Justification: PB 2016 Air Force - PE 0207138F: F”, USAF, 2015. http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/budget/fy2016/usaf-peds/0207138f_7_pb_2016.pdf
[15] “Critical Ingredient In Short Supply”, John A. Tirpak, March 2016. http://www.airforcemag.com/MagazineArchive/Documents/2016/March%202016/0316f22.pdf
[16] “Air Force Evaluating New Targeting Monocle for F-22 Raptor”, Dave Majumdar, 2014.
https://news.usni.org/2014/05/16/air-force-evaluating-new-targeting-monocle-f-22-raptor
[18] F-15C Eagle vs Mig-23/25, Douglas C. Dildy & Tom Cooper, 2016.  
[19] “Critical Ingredient In Short Supply”, John A. Tirpak, March 2016. http://www.airforcemag.com/MagazineArchive/Documents/2016/March%202016/0316f22.pdf
[20] “Exhibit R-2, RDT&E Budget Item Justification: PB 2016 Air Force - PE 0207138F: F”, USAF, 2015. http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/budget/fy2016/usaf-peds/0207138f_7_pb_2016.pdf
[21] Ibid.  

Works Consulted


"Air Force F-22 Fighter Program", Jeremiah Gertler, July 2013. 
"Final Environmental Assessment for Force Structure Changes at Langley Air Force Base, VA", ACC, 2011. 
"F-22 Raptor History", Global Security, last modified January 2016. 
"F-22 Raptor in Action", Lou Drendel, Squadron Signal, June 2011. 
"Langley receives last Raptor, completes fleet", Chase S. DeMayo, 2007.
http://www.f-16.net/f-22-news-article2138.html
"Lockheed Martin to upgrade F-22 for AIM-9X missile", IHS Janes 360, 2014.
http://www.janes.com/article/45114/lockheed-martin-to-upgrade-f-22-for-aim-9x-missile 
"Program Profile: F-22", Aviation Week Intelligence Network, last visited June 2016.
"Raptor's New Claws: The F-22 Stealth Fighter Is More Lethal than Ever", Dave Majumdar
http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/raptors-new-claws-the-f-22-stealth-fighter-more-lethal-ever-15434 

Sunday, June 26, 2016

Building the F-22C "Super Raptor" - Article Announcement & Updates


Image 1: Notional F-22C Super Raptor.

My apologies for the long publishing hiatus, I wanted to check in with my new employer before publishing articles. In celebration of 500,000 site views, I'll publish the article "Building the F-22C 'Super Raptor'" in a week or so. The article will discuss the option of upgrading the current raptor fleet to the F-22C standard given the USAF increasingly seems as if it will adopt a systems of systems approach with respect to sixth generation aircraft i.e. developing several new technologies and integrating them on current platforms. The F-22C would incorporate many of the upgrades originally planned for the F-22 such as side looking arrays, advanced infrared search and track system (AIRST) and HMD in addition to new sixth generation technologies such as variable cycle engines. I'll also discuss various options with respect to the F-22 fleet such as upgrading the 36 increment 2.0 aircraft used for training and the possibility of a production restart.


Wednesday, May 18, 2016

Innovation and Air Dominance: Human-Machine Combat Teaming, A SoS Solution to Air Superiority - Part II


Image 4: Possible SoS solution to air superiority circa 2025. Image Credit: Matt

Lt. Gen. James M. "Mike" Holmes, Deputy Chief of Staff for Strategic Plans and Requirements, and other senior USAF officials have advocated for a systems of systems (SoS) solution to U.S. air superiority which would grant greater modularity, lower cost, and acquisition speed when compared to a traditional follow-on platform approach. Ultimately a SoS approach to air superiority has the potential to deliver on many of the aforementioned benefits above, but a manned sixth generation follow-on platform is still required to ensure a robust air superiority capability following a lengthier acquisition cycle. The debate within the USAF for an SoS approach to air superiority has been influenced by broader DoD discussions of the third offset strategy and human-machine combat teaming. 
Human-machine combat teaming is an integral aspect of the third offset strategy which includes not only greater use and development of autonomous and semi-autonomous systems but also the organization of data and battlefield networks to facilitate greater situational awareness and human decision making.[1] Deputy Defense Secretary Robert Work cites the Army’s MUM-T system, in which an AH-64E attack helicopter can control an MQ-1C Grey Eagle, as an example of a highly capable human-machine combat system predating the third offset strategy; the MQ-1C’s remotely piloted vehicle (RPA) sensors enable the AH-64E to fire its hellfire missiles at longer ranges than otherwise possible using only the AH-64E’s sensors.[2] The Avatar/ Skyborg program by the Strategic Capabilities Office (SCO) is frequently touted as a representative example of expected future human-machine combat teaming, the Avatar program is often referred to as the “loyal wingman” concept by the USAF.  The Avatar program seeks to modify older fourth generation aircraft into unmanned systems, such as the QF-16 target drone, and pair them with manned 5th generation assets. The unmanned systems would act as a force multiplier for manned assets by carrying additional weapons which would be queued by the sensors of other assets in a battlefield network.
Colonel Michael W. Pietrucha’s concept for a semi-autonomous force multiplier unmanned combat aerial vehicle (UCAV) outlined in, The Next Lightweight Fighter, provides a useful intellectual framework from which to conceptualize the role and requirements of the loyal wingman concept,
The UCAV will not replace the manned fighter aircraft – we cannot build a control system to replicate the sensing and processing ability of trained aircrews. Nevertheless, UCAVs may play a valuable role as a supplementary system. Not remotely piloted aircraft [RPA], they will operate semiautonomously, serving as literal wingmen of limited capabilities. We can build the technology to fly an aircraft and execute the preprogramed routines. The ‘brains’ of the operation will remain the nearby human, who needs only to tell the UCAV what to do and (mostly) forget about it.[3]
The UCAV would not be a dogfighter in the traditional sense. Rather, the UCAV would act as a “missile truck” for 5th generation assets given the limited internal carriage of weapons in the F-22 and F-35. Therefore, the design can sacrifice many of the design attributes associated with high-end maneuverability in favor of payload, endurance, and range. Pietrucha outlines three modes from which his proposed F-40 Warhawk UCAV could operate: autonomous, semi-autonomous, and cooperative. However, Pietrucha’s vision of autonomous capabilities are relatively modest such as basic aviation capabilities related to navigation of predesignated locations and weapons employment against fixed targets. In the Air Force publication, Autonomous Horizons, the USAF Office of the Chief Scientist mirrors many of Pietrucha’s technical feasibility reservations regarding fully autonomous combat aircraft.[4]



Image 5: BVR detection and engagement ranges between the F-35 armed with an AIM-120D vs. a Su-30MK with a R-77M-PD. The length between points is to scale with real world figures, the width is not. Its also important to note the maximum kinematic range of each missile is never the actual effective range of the missile which is contingent upon its launch point with corresponding airspeed and altitude of launch platform as well as its position or aspect relative to the maneuvering target among other factors. Even with all these factors in consideration, the U.S. still maintains a substantial advantage in BVR as a result of low observability and more powerful AESA radars. Image Credit: Matt

            While a fully autonomous within visual range (WVR) capable UCAV could conceivably outmaneuver and outperform human pilots by virtue of lacking biological limitations, the technological, legal, and financial barriers are too significant to realistically field the system within the next decade. Furthermore, even if all the aforementioned challenges to autonomy were solved, the USAF would likely fiercely oppose any unmanned fighter on the basis of institutional-cultural grounds as demonstrated by the resistance to adopting the much more modest proposal of arming the MQ-1.[5] As an institution, the USAF has placed enormous faith in the longevity of the U.S.’ comparative advantages in stealth and avionics which enable “first shot first kill” capability. Unmanned systems have the capacity to solidify the U.S.’ comparative advantage in BVR engagements but will be unable to fulfill the WVR classic dogfighting requirement that traditional follow-on platforms provide; a manned sixth generation fighter is still necessary. U.S. strategic competitors have made significant progress in eroding the U.S.’ BVR advantage by fielding in theater numerically superior forces with both high missile loads and effective jamming to reduce the pk of U.S. radar guided missiles. A manned sixth generation platform provides a hedge against technological uncertainty by providing historically relevant capabilities in the context of the measure-countermeasure competition between the U.S. and potential adversaries in BVR technologies. While the USAF’s goal is to produce a sixth generation platform with an IOC by 2030, given numerous historical examples such as the F-35 program, an IOC by 2030 is likely optimistic. A low cost SoS solution incorporating a loyal wingman UCAV to smooth the transition between fifth and sixth generation platforms would be invaluable for the USAF.



Image 6: The loyal wingman concept is in many ways reminiscent of Lockheed Martin's modular optionally manned Saber Warrior concept. Image Credit: Lockheed Martin. 

The loyal wingman concept and other forms of human-machine combat systems naturally fit within a broader SoS architecture in terms of concepts of operation. SoS refers to a organizational structure in which multiple specialized independent systems are utilized in conjunction with one another to generate synergistic effects which are greater than the sum of independently operating those systems. SoS solutions are contrasted by platform centric solutions which seek to field highly capable multi-function platforms capable of undertaking a wide spectrum of missions.[6] Advocates of the SoS approach argue the more specialized and limited requirements for each individual component within the SoS decreases cost and technical challenges. Additionally, the low cost and technical risk of each component enables rapid replacement and greater agility when upgrading the SoS. In an environment of approximate technological parity, the ability to quickly upgrade and reconfigure systems in order to counter adversary developments is invaluable. Rather than defeating an adversary outright as a result of superior technology, the pronounced aversion to high technical risk platforms has guided the service to place a greater emphasis on concepts of operation and the integration of several different mature but promising technologies, as SoS can, to deter and defeat near-peer competitors.
At a CNAS event in 2015, Deputy Secretary Robert Work remarked on the current strategic environment with respect to integrating existing technologies into operational concepts: “…this is much more like the inter-war period, where everything was available and all you had to do -- it was the competitors who put the components together into operational and organizational constructs that gave them the advantage.”[7] The inter-war period and early Cold War demonstrate the feasibility of SoS with respect to two foundational concepts of peacetime innovation: (1) superior concepts of operation can result in decisive battlefield results over a technically and numerically matched adversary and (2) effective management of technological uncertainty is achievable through extensive prototyping and diversifying investment in several technologies. For example, the Wehrmacht’s success in the battle of France was determined not by technological superiority but by its organizational structure and superior understanding of armored warfare developed in the interwar period. In May 1940, French and British tank forces not only had numerical superiority over the Germans, but also allied tanks often had superior firepower and protection relative to German tanks.[8] The U.S. development of guided missiles between 1945 and 1955 serves as a model in which technological uncertainty was mitigated through extensive prototyping of multiple systems, but procurement was deferred until other uncertainties – such as political considerations, were resolved; the diversification and risk mitigation of several technologies has a high degree of applicability to a SoS approach to air superiority. [9] With the aforementioned principles to peacetime innovation in mind, the following recommendations would enable the USAF to field a SoS approach to air superiority which would significantly augment existing platforms within a relatively short period between 2025 and 2030.
The focus of this SoS approach to air superiority is to seek promising existing technologies and integrate them in such a way that the U.S. can quickly produce new capabilities at a relatively low cost; all the systems discussed are either operational, in the midst of the procurement process, or incorporate mature technologies but no procurement decision has been approved. The approach seeks to solve as many of the six aforementioned challenges to air superiority the U.S. will face in the Asia-Pacific between 2025 and 2030. The following are the major components in the proposed SoS solution to air superiority: the miniature air launched decoy (MALD), SACM, loyal wingman, and 5th generation fighter platform. As MALD, 5th generation platforms, and SACM have all been approved from a development perspective, this paper will focus on the development and integration of a loyal wingman aircraft to the other SoS components. An analysis of the role of the loyal wingman and its associated benefits and limitations will be followed by an analysis of recommendations regarding how to transition the SoS concept into an operational reality.


Image 7: SoS components. The design characteristic of SACM, that it can fit on a SDB rack, is inferred from Lockheed Martin's CUDA concept which competed and ultimately lost against Raytheon's SACM concept which has not been revealed at this time. Image Credit: Matt

            The rapid pace at which the loyal wingman would need to be developed necessitates fairly conservative requirements to boost acquisition agility. The core requirements of any force multiplier type UCAV are: semi-autonomous control via F-35 and F-22, air-to-air missile storage capacity, reduced radar cross section, extended range and endurance, and low cost and technical risk. The use of a secure resilient data link would enable 5th generation platforms to act as forward command and control (C2) assets by directing larger formations of force multiplier type loyal wingman UCAVs. The superior avionics and integration of data via fused sensor inputs of 5th generation fighters naturally facilitates this C2 role. Over the skies of Syria, F-22 pilots regularly guide and direct other assets given their superior situational awareness of the battlefield.[10] This SoS approach would expand upon those C2 capabilities by granting the F-22 and F-35 pilots control over UCAVs. The following is a hypothetical scenario which demonstrates the utility of a SoS solution to air superiority featuring MALD, SACM, the loyal wingman, and 5th generation platforms:
  1. 24 MALDs fly towards an adversary IADS and utilize their onboard signature augmentation subsystems to mimic a formation of F-15s
  2. An adversary formation of 20 Su-30s detects the decoys via radar and fires a salvo of R-77 BVR radar guided missiles
  3. A formation of 4 F-35s operating in a low electronic signature state detect the radar emissions of the Su-30s utilizing their geolocation apertures and determine their position via time difference of arrival (TDOA)
  4. The lead pilot in the F-35 formation commands 8 nearby low observable UCAVs to fire their payload of 48 SACMs in lock-on after launch (LOAL) mode
  5. The lead F-35 pilot guides the SACMs to the approximate location of the Su-30s via a two-way data link with each missile
  6. The terminal seekers of the SACMs activate when in close proximity to the Su-30 formation, the use of LOAL and a two-way data link gives the Su-30s the minimum possible time to detect the missiles and employ countermeasures thereby maximizing the missile’s pk
Of the six major aforementioned challenges with respect to establishing air superiority in the Pacific, a SoS approach has the potential to solve the reduced missile storage and pk issues as well as both mitigating strain on aerial refueling assets and reducing the PRC’s regional numerical superiority. The service does not have time to initiate a new clean-sheet design if it seeks an operational capability between 2025 and 2030, an existing design with modification potential must be selected. Two possible designs meet the desired requirements for the loyal wingman: a modified QF-16 and Predator-C Avenger.


Author's Note: "Part III - Loyal Wingman Options and Procurement Strategy" will be published shortly. 



[1] Sydney J. Freedberg, Jr., “People, Not Tech: DepSecDef Work On 3rd Offset, JICSPOC”, February 2016. http://breakingdefense.com/2016/02/its-not-about-technology-bob-work-on-the-3rd-offset-strategy/
[2] Richard Whittle, “MUM-T Is the Word for AH-64E: Helos Fly, Use Drones “, January 2015. http://breakingdefense.com/2015/01/mum-t-is-the-word-for-ah-64e-helos-fly-use-drones/
[3] Col Michael W. Pietrucha, "The Next Lightweight Fighter", Air & Space Power Journal, August-July 2013.
[4] United States Air Force Office of the Chief Scientist, "Autonomous Horizons", June 2015. http://www.af.mil/Portals/1/documents/SECAF/AutonomousHorizons.pdf?timestamp=1435068339702
[5] Richard Whittle, Predator, (Henry Hold and Company, 2014).
[6] John Shaw, “System of Systems Integration Technology and Experimentation (SoSITE)”. http://www.darpa.mil/program/system-of-systems-integration-technology-and-experimentation
[7] Robert Work, “Deputy Secretary of Defense Speech”, December 2014. http://www.defense.gov/News/Speeches/Speech-View/Article/634214/cnas-defense-forum
[8] Steven J.Zaloga, PANZER IV VS CHAR B1 BIS France 1940, Osprey Publishing, 2011.
[9] Stephen Peter Rosen, Winning the Next War, (Cornell University Press, 1991).
[10] Lolita C. Baldor, “F-22 Raptor Ensures other War-Fighting Aircraft Survive Over Syria”, July 2015. http://www.military.com/daily-news/2015/07/21/f22-raptor-ensures-other-war-fighting-aircraft-survive-syria.html

Monday, May 16, 2016

Innovation and Air Dominance: 2025 and Beyond - Part I Intro


Image 1: F-22s from the 27th FS transit from Wake Island to Anderson AFB, Guam. Image Credit: USAF, Captain Gary Wallace.

Author's Note: This article series will discuss the anti-access threat environment the U.S. is likely to encounter post-2025 and advocates for both a near-term systems of systems (SoS) solution and a longer-term manned sixth generation fighter to bolster future U.S. air superiority capabilities. Parts I and II will discuss the SoS proposal which acts as a hedge against expected acquisition delays for a manned sixth generation replacement for the F-22. Parts III and IV will discuss the sixth generation F-X. Apologies for any inconsistent footnote or citation formatting, the Blogger template does not easily accommodate citations.

Air Superiority – A Foundational Element of American Security

Air superiority is a foundational objective to not only all other United States Air Force (USAF) core missions such as space control, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), rapid mobility, global strike, and command and control, but also air superiority is critical to the success of the joint force and a core tenant of the American way of war.[1][2] In the post-Cold War era, the USAF and U.S. policymakers have become accustomed to uncontested freedom of action across multiple domains in permissive environments such as Iraq and Afghanistan. The lopsided success of coalition forces against the integrated air defense systems (IADS) of Iraq in 1991 and Libya in 2011 are attributable to both technological and training advantages of coalition forces. The overwhelming capabilities of American airpower have become associated as a uniquely American capability to destroy an adversary’s means to wage war at minimal cost; the formidable reputation of American air power thereby serves as a powerful deterrent.[3] However, the technologies which form the basis for the U.S.’ current qualitative military edge provided by the second offset strategy have proliferated to U.S. strategic competitors such as the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the Russian Federation; the fielding of anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) threats severely constrains the U.S. ability to project power, maintain freedom of action, and secure use of the global commons which are historically integral U.S. national security objectives.[4]
The PRC’s A2/AD strategy in particular threatens many of the core national military and security objectives outlined by the Joint Chiefs of Staff such as: protecting vital economic interests, U.S. allies, and U.S. overseas territories.[5] The combination of the evolving threat environment and the 15 to 20 year traditional weapons acquisition process has elevated the sense of urgency within the USAF to rapidly field capabilities to address the threat environment to the joint force.[6] This paper will propose (1) fielding a modular low cost systems of systems (SoS) approach to air superiority between 2025 and 2030 and (2) accelerating the USAF’s sixth generation F-X program to replace the fifth generation F-22 in the dedicated high-end air dominance role with an initial operational capability (IOC) no later than 2035. An analysis of the expected future threat environment will be provided prior to an examination of the SoS proposal, the F-X program, how the USAF could accelerate the program, budgetary considerations, and relevant counter arguments.

The A2/AD Threat Environment of 2030


Image 2: PRC A2/AD systems. Image Credit: CSBA 

The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) was largely a poorly trained, Soviet equipped, and manpower centric defense force for much of the 1970s and 1980s. The decisive results of the Persian Gulf War surprised many PRC strategic planners and contributed towards an internal belief within the PLA that it was insufficiently prepared to confront the U.S. and that a conventional force-on-force engagement with the U.S. was not a viable option.[5][6] The general deterioration of Sino-U.S. relations following Tiananmen Square in 1989, the Third Taiwanese Strait Crisis in 1996, and the U.S. bombing of the Chinese embassy in Kosovo in 1999 all provided the impetus for China's development of its current A2/AD strategy and transformative military modernization effort.[7] In 2015, the PRC spent $215 billion on its military making it the second largest source of global military expenditures after the U.S.[8]The PRC’s modernization effort more broadly is contextualized by its national objectives set by the Chinese Communist Party (CPP):
·         Perpetuating CCP rule;
·         Sustaining economic growth and development;
·         Maintaining domestic political stability;
·         Defending national sovereignty and territorial integrity; and
·         Securing China’s status as a great power and, ultimately, reacquiring regional preeminence[9]
The PRC leadership has clearly shown its preference for asserting regional hegemony by gradually altering the status quo by coercing U.S. allies below the threshold of overt military force.[10] However, the PRC actively seeks “counter intervention” capabilities (反侵入 or 反干涉) which facilitate PRC regional hegemony by denying the U.S. the ability to intervene on behalf of threatened U.S. allies such as the Philippines, Japan, or Taiwan in the event of hostilities.[11] To constrain US power projection near its shores, the PRC has implemented a host of A2/AD systems including: sea mines, anti-ship cruise missiles, electronic and GPS jamming, submarines, anti-satellite weapons, conventional land attack and anti-ship ballistic missiles, and extensive surface to air missile systems (SAM) networked with air power.[12] These systems collectively limit how close US forces can safely operate in proximity to the PRC. The PRC’s acquisition of advanced SAMs such as the HQ-9 and advanced fifth generation fighters such as the J-20 and J-31 are a particularly significant challenge to U.S. regional air power.
While the F-22 provides unmatched air superiority capabilities, the original requirements for the F-22 are becoming less relevant for the Asia-Pacific threat environment of 2030, particularly its limited range; original Advanced Tactical Fighter (ATF) program requirements called for a fighter which could penetrate Soviet and Warsaw Pact airspace from a network of nearby bases in Western Europe.[13] Any sixth generation solution to bolster U.S. air superiority capabilities in the not too distant future of 2030 will face the following challenges with respect to the Asia-Pacific region in support of the Administration’s pivot:
  1. The PRC is expected to retain an in theater regional numerical superiority over the U.S. in terms of deployed fighter aircraft even with a surge force deployed from the continental U.S.[14]
  2. Air superiority requires secure bases close to the desired operational area; the significant distances between U.S. and allied facilities in the Pacific relative to key areas of interest such as the Strait of Taiwan, East China Sea, and South China Sea will cripple sortie generation rates and would put a tremendous strain on U.S. tanker assets[15]
  3. Air bases close in proximity of China, such as Kadena, are not only within range of China’s short to medium range conventional ballistic missiles, but also feature few hardened aircraft shelters and exposed above ground fuel depots[16]
  4. The emergence of high quality low cost digital radio frequency memory (DRFM) jammers has significantly degraded BVR radar guided missile probability of kill (pk) performance while U.S. fifth generation aircraft have a reduced missile load due to their internal carriage of weapons for the purposes of low observability
  5. Increasingly capable very high frequency (VHF) radars will degrade the effectiveness of X and S-band optimized stealth aircraft, such as the F-22 and F-35, into the late 2020s to 2030s; VHF radars do not provide target quality track data and could at best serve as early warning systems to que other assets[17]

Image 3: Approximate distances of U.S. and allied air bases in the Western Pacific relative to key areas of interest. The F-22’s unrefueled internal stores only combat radius at is 410 nautical miles (nm) with a ferry range of at least 820 nm: blue = locations with no inflight refueling required per sortie, yellow = at least one per sortie, red = at least two per sortie.[18][19][i]

In response to the evolving threat environment, the USAF continues to work with its sister services to devise means to counter A2/AD capabilities under the Joint Concept for Access and Maneuver in the Global Commons (JAM-GC) operational concept, formerly Air-Sea Battle.  JAM-GC is not a war plan nor is it directed at any one country, rather JAM-GC’s purpose is to provide an operational level description on how the joint force will gain and maintain freedom of action across all domains in the global commons; attaining freedom of action is necessary as it is the precursor to all other operations including deterrence and power projection.[20] Under JAM-GC, the joint force will conduct networked integrated operations capable of attacking in-depth to disrupt, destroy, and defeat adversary forces.[21]  
The USAF will comprise a core component of the joint force’s collective capability to attack in-depth through a highly contested A2/AD zone with a mixed force of F-35s, B-21s (LRS-B), and sixth generation F-X fighters. Without a sixth generation F-X to provide air superiority, the ability to attain freedom of action for the joint force is compromised. The F-X’s extended range, deep magazine capacity, and broadband all aspect stealth will enable the F-X to survive in the most contested A2/AD environments and execute key air superiority and destruction of enemy air defense (DEAD) missions. However, between late 2015 to early 2016, the USAF has grown increasingly noncommittal towards pursuing an F-X platform given the immediate needs of the service relative to the acquisitions process.[22] The hesitation to commit to an F-X platform within the USAF coincides with the broader Department of Defense’s (DoD) third offset strategy, a competitive strategy which seeks to maintain the U.S. military’s qualitative technological superiority over near-peer adversaries.

Author's Note: "Human-Machine Combat Teaming: A SoS Solution to Air Superiority" will be published shortly.


[1] USAF, “Air Force Core Missions”, August 15, 2013.  http://www.af.mil/News/ArticleDisplay/tabid/223/Article/466868/air-force-core-missions.aspx
[2] Colin S. Gray, “The Air Power Advantage in the Future”, December, 2007. http://aupress.maxwell.af.mil/digital/pdf/paper/ap_0002_gray_airpower_advantage_future_warfare.pdf
[3] Eliot A. Cohen, “The Mystique of U.S. Air Power”, Foreign Affairs, Jan. – February, 1994, pp. 109-124. 
[4] William J. Perry, et al, “Ensuring a Strong U.S. Defense for the Future – The National Defense Panel Review of the Quadrennial Defense Review”, 2014.
[5] “Robert Farley, What Scares China's Military: The 1991 Gulf War”, November 24, 2014. http://nationalinterest.org/feature/what-scares-chinas-military-the-1991-gulf-war-11724
[6] Sam J. Tangredi, Anti-Access Warfare: Countering A2/AD Strategies (Naval Institute Press: 2013).
[7]Andrew S. Erickson, “Chinese Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile (ASBM) Development: Drivers, Trajectories and Strategic Implications”, May 2013.
[8] Jon Gambrell, “Global military spending nearly $1.7T amid Mideast conflicts”, April 4, 2016.   http://bigstory.ap.org/article/d9a7ab6fb5f4430db369b80c696e62fb/global-military-spending-nearly-17t-amid-mideast-conflicts
[9] “Annual Report To Congress Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2015”, Department of Defense, 2015. http://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2015_China_Military_Power_Report.pdf
[10] Truong Minh Vu and Ngo Di Lan, “Flexible Response To Deter In The South China Sea”, April 7, 2016.
[11] Timothy Heath and Andrew S. Erickson, “Is China Pursuing Counter-Intervention?”, The Washington Quarterly, Fall 2015.  https://twq.elliott.gwu.edu/sites/twq.elliott.gwu.edu/files/downloads/TWQ_Fall2015_Heath-Erickson.pdf
[12] Matthew J. Jouppi, “America's Sixth Generation Fighters: The F-X and F/A-XX”, February 18, 2015. http://manglermuldoon.blogspot.com/2015/02/americas-sixth-generation-fighters-f-x_4.html
[13] Carlo Kopp, “The Advanced Tactical Fighter [YF-22 and YF-23]”, last modified 2005. http://www.ausairpower.net/TE-ATF-91.html
[14] John Stilton and Scott Perdue, “Air Combat Past, Present, and Future”, August 2008.  https://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/files/2008_RAND_Pacific_View_Air_Combat_Briefing.pdf
[15] Ibid.
[16] Ibid.
[17]  Dave Majumdar, “Chinese and Russian Radars On Track To See Through U.S. Stealth”, July 2014. https://news.usni.org/2014/07/29/chinese-russian-radars-track-see-u-s-stealth
[18] Google Maps Data, 2016.
[19] Department of Defense, “Selected Acquisition Report (SAR) The F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF), Mary 18, 2015. http://fas.org/man/eprint/F35-sar-2016.pdf#page=16
[20] Terry S. Morris, et al., “Securing Operational Access: Evolving the Air-Sea Battle Concept”, February 11, 2015
[21] CDR John Callaway, “THE OPERATIONAL ART OF AIR-SEA BATTLE”, July 18, 2014.
[22] James Drew, “USAF backs off sixth-gen 'fighter' in quest for air supremacy”, April 2016. https://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/usaf-backs-off-sixth-gen-fighter-in-quest-for-air-423994/




[i] Total trip distance is twice the distance from the area of interest relative to the base. The number of full aerial refueling required is calculated by dividing total trip distance by ferry range. This is an approximate figure as the aircraft will have extra fuel upon reaching its maximum combat radius to conduct its mission i.e. patrol an area before returning to base. Furthermore, fuel efficiency is also variable depending upon altitude. Lastly, the 410 nm includes a 100 nm supercruise sprint. An internal stores only at subsonic speed combat radius is likely much larger than 410 nm.