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Tuesday, October 21, 2014

Resurgent Russia - Part III: The US Response in Context


Image 1: M1A2SEP main battle tanks participating in the Combined Resolve II exercises in Germany. Image Credit: US Army, 2014. 

Part I and Part II discussed Russian objectives in Eurasia and the methods it has used to meet its two main objectives: achieving nuclear parity with the United States and establishing Russian hegemony in the near abroad. Upcoming articles will make a series of military, diplomatic, and economic recommendations to the Obama Administration and the Congress with the goal of  safeguarding American interests in Europe. In order to put the recommendations in context, a brief overview of the US grand strategy in foreign policy will be provided.  

The grand strategy of the United States has been to to maintain hegemony in the Western hemisphere by ensuring no great power rivals form within its periphery while simultaneously preventing other powers from attaining hegemony in their own geographic region. 

"The underlying rationale behind this policy is straightforward: As long as Eurasia is divided among many major powers, these states tend to worry most about each other and cannot concentrate their capabilities or their attention on the United States. Nor can they do much to interfere in the Western hemisphere. This situation maximizes U.S. security and makes it possible for the United States to intervene in far-flung regions without having to worry very much about defending its own soil." - Stephen Walt, 2014 

For example, the United States contested the Soviet Union's dominance in Eurasia throughout the Cold War which subsequently forced the Soviet Union to commit the bulk of its forces in Eastern Europe. America's grand strategy is greatly augmented by the unique geopolitical state of North America. Otto von Bismark observed, "The Americans are truly a lucky people. They are bordered to the north and south by weak neighbors and to the east and west by fish". The relative stability of North America is in sharp contrast with the geo-political realities of both Russia and China who are bordered by much more demanding neighbors (from a security perspective). Thus, United States is uncontested in the Western hemisphere and its homeland is secure from nearby state actors which allows the United States to intervene in other regions of the world - namely to contest the hegemony of other powers - by maintaining a robust overseas presence when compared to other states.

The US has been able to maintain hegemony in the Western hemisphere, in part, due to its extensive system of alliances spanning from Europe to the Asia-Pacific. The United States has been largely able to avoid the historical trend of many countries that have ascended to great power status: 

"The fundamental pattern of international relations is that as a country becomes powerful and asserts itself, others gang up to bring it down. That's what happened to the Habsburg Empire, Napoleonic France, Germany and the Soviet Union. There is one great exception to this rule in modern history: the United States. America has risen to global might, and yet it has not produced the kind of opposition that many would have predicted. In fact, today it is in the astonishing position of being the world's dominant power while many of the world's next most powerful nations--Britain, France, Germany, Japan--are all allied with it." - Fareed Zakaria, 2013 

Thus, frequently discussed factors such as the size of the US economy, technological advantages, size and quality of the US military, etc. cannot fully account for American hegemony. The robust network of US alliances has the dual effect of not only increasing the number of countries willing to assist the United States, but also the alliance system significantly decreases the number of states who seek to oppose the United States.

The common critique of the Obama Administration's foreign policy, which asserts the Administration lacks a grand strategy or an underlying organizational principle - aside from the widely recognized "don't do stupid sh*t" doctrine -  is largely unfounded. The Obama Administration is clearly continuing to enact the post-World War II US grand strategy of maintaining hegemony through a system of military and diplomatic alliances. The Pivot is among the best examples of the Administration's continuation of the aforementioned policies (Walt, 2014). Applying the US grand strategy within the Russian context will be crucial for protecting US interests in Europe. The following objectives are derived from promoting American hegemony as per the grand strategy within the context of dealing with Russia after the Ukraine crisis: 

(1) Protect existing US allies from both conventional and unconventional military forces from Russia
(2) Contest Russian economic, diplomatic, and military hegemony in Eurasia, principally within the post-Soviet states in the near abroad
(3) Do not facilitate further cooperation between the People's Republic of China and the Russian Federation 
(4) Establish a compartmentalized relationship with Russia such that critical issues to the United States which require Russian assistance (principally the enforcement of Iranian sanctions) can continue
(5) Do not commit to new major unilateral security commitments in Eastern Europe    
(6) Continue existing nuclear modernization programs 

Many of these objectives are inherently contradictory with one another to varying degrees which made formulating an appropriate foreign policy response difficult. However, a response which meets these objectives is possible and will be discussed later in the series; the US has a number of diplomatic, economic, and military tools to accomplish the objectives listed above. Part VI will discuss the role between the US and other NATO countries within the context of meeting US objectives. 

Author's Note: I apologize for the comparatively short article but the complexities of NATO merited an entirely separate article e.g. the disparity in political will to use force between NATO member nations, issues related to the level of aggregate member defense spending, the type of defense spending some NATO countries prioritize to the detriment of the force, etc. 

Sources 

  1. U.S. Collective Defense Arrangements, Department of State, 2014. http://www.state.gov/s/l/treaty/collectivedefense/ 
  2. What Has Asia Done for Uncle Sam Lately?, Stephen Walt, 2014. http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/05/15/what_has_asia_done_for_uncle_sam_lately_pivot_obama_china
  3. America the Isolated?, Fareed Zakaria, 2013. http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,2143560,00.html 

Tuesday, October 14, 2014

News and Updates October 2014


The American Innovation blog has undergone a few changes since the last update including: new additions to the blog articles by topic tab, corrected images which originally did not display properly for the "Should the US Sell Taiwan New F-16s?" article, and added new blogs I recommend to the reading list on the right side bar.

I apologize for the lack of articles in recent weeks. Midterms will be over soon and I will be able to resume publishing articles again shortly.

Upcoming Articles

Assisting Taiwan: How the US Can Realistically Improve Taiwan's Military Posture

The Chinese military's modernization since the 1990s has been nothing short of remarkable. In nearly every respect, from equipment to training, the disparity between the Chinese-Taiwan military balance has shifted in China's favor over the last decade. China's growing economic, political, and military influence in the Asia-Pacific region has triggered a strong US response via the Rebalance. The US has sought to expand ties with several countries nervous of China's growing territorial ambitions but Taiwan remains a difficult case. China opposes any and all US weapon sales and other forms of support to the island nation. China's growing lobbying efforts against the sale of new equipment to Taiwan is evident in the Obama Administration's decision to offer an upgrade package for Taiwan's existing F-16 Block 20 fleet as a compromise rather than granting their initial request for 66 new F-16 C/D Block 50/52+ aircraft. The author will discuss methods in which the United States can support Taiwan with reduced political backlash from China, and the extent in which the US should value military to military contacts with China given the apparent lack of change in Chinese behavior with respect to territorial issues.

Resurgent Russia Part III 

Despite the ceasefire in Ukraine, the US-Russia relationship will likely be marked by a new sense of animosity and rivalry for years to come. The United States must adapt to the strategic reality that the Russian Federation cannot be counted on as a "partner nation" or "responsible stakeholder" in the international system. However, Russia's new found confidence to assert itself in world affairs must be viewed in context in terms of other US strategic priorities. Frankly speaking, a purely hawkish approach to Russia will not be conducive to promoting global US interests. The United States sill requires Russian cooperation in enforcing international sanctions against Iran and intense US pressure on Russia will only drive Putin to expand military, political, and economic ties with China. While inherent geo-political factors make a formal alliance nearly impossible between Russia and China, the two countries still could expand cooperation in ways that would pose a significant challenge to the United States. At the same time, the US must prevent the formation of a Russian hegemony in Eastern Europe while many NATO member states continue to slide into strategic irrelevance.

Recommended Media




SS-N-22 Sunburn hits derelict ship 1:20

China Deploys A Mechanized ‘Peace Mission’ - By Richard D. Fisher, Jr

Tuesday, September 23, 2014

Quick Thoughts: F-22s in Syria

UDPATED 9/24: Revisions reflect new information on Arab forces and corrections on Tomahawk launch locations


Image 1: F-22 taking off from Al Dhafra air base in the UAE to participate in operations over Syria. Image Credit: USAF, 2014.

American F-22s entered combat for the first time in the early morning hours of September 23rd. Roughly 200 munitions were expended on 22 targets by a mix of B-1B, F-15E, F-16, F/A-18, and F-22 aircraft along with 47 Tomahawk cruise missiles launched from the USS Arleigh Burke and USS Philippine Sea from the Red Sea and Arabian Sea respectively. A total of 48 US aircraft were joined by aircraft from Saudi Arabia, Jordan, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Bahrain which all served in direct combat roles. Qatar abstained from bombing targets in Syria but graciously provided logistical support and access to its facilities. According to Tyler Rogoway from Foxtrot Alpha, the following Arab aircraft participated in the strike:

four Jordanian F-16MLU Vipers
four Saudi F-15S Eagles
four UAE F-16E/F Block 60 Vipers
two F-16C Vipers from Bahrain

The F-22s participating in the strike were likely from the 1st Figher Wing (FW) based at Langley-Eustis Virginia; A group of six block 35 F-22s from the 1st FW were sighted in transit to Al Dhafra air base in the UAE earlier in April (Cenciotti, 2014). The F-22s participated in the second of three waves of aircraft bombing ISIL, Al Nusra Front, and Khorasan Group targets.  Below is video from an unidentified aircraft recording an F-22 strike against an ISIL compound.



It is unknown if the aircraft participating in the strike were upgraded to the increment 3.1 standard which offers a host of significant improvements including: synthetic aperture radar (SAR) modes to the AN/APG-77, electronic attack capabilities, geo-location of electro-magnetic emitters, and GBU-39 Small-Diameter Bomb (SDB I) integration. If the aircraft were not upgraded to the 3.1 standard, it can likely be assumed the Raptors used 1,000 pound Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAM). However, in the author's opinion, the effects of the four of munitions used on the structure (two munitions can be observed hitting the structure at the 9 second mark and another pair of munitions can briefly be seen impacting the structure at the 11 second mark prior to the cut towards a farther distance perspective) in the video above are more consistent with the effects of four 250 lb SDB Is rather than four of the much larger 1,000 lb JDAMs.

Increment 3.1 aircraft would be significantly more useful to American forces striking targets in Syria relative to increment 2.0 aircraft given the SAR, SDB I, and geo-location capabilities; increment 3.1 upgrades allow the F-22 to become a potent suppression of enemy air defense (SEAD) aircraft. F-22s over Syria were likely assigned to protect other coalition aircraft in the event the Assad regime activated its integrated air defense system (IADS) or launched what remained of its air force in addition to preforming an air to ground strike (Mehta, 2014). The Syrian Air Force is equipped with Mig-21 and Mig-29 fighter aircraft but the combat readiness Assad's fighter fleet is questionable. However, the Syrian response was minimal in terms of actions despite the strong protest in rhetoric. Both Iran and Syrian officials were informed shortly in advance of the strikes and given assurances Assad regime forces would not be targeted. Syrian radar acquisitions on US aircraft were passive, indicating that Assad's forces sought to avoid confrontation (Pande & Babb, 2014).

It is notable that no report mentions the participation of of  Battlefield Airborne Communications Node (BACN) or similar "gateway" aircraft in support of strikes against ISIL. The F-22's intra-flight data link (IFTL) can only transmit and receive signals to other F-22s or specialized gateway aircraft which in turn translate the signal for other aircraft. Without a gateway aircraft, F-22s would only be able to receive Link-16 tracks (the standard data-link for many US-NATO equipped fighter aircraft ) and would be unable to transmit its own Link-16 tracks to other aircraft particpating in the strikes such as the F-16s (Majumdar, 2012). Until the Raptor fleet is upgraded to the 3.2A standard, F-22s will lack two way Link-16 capability. Raptor pilots might have resorted to using unstealthy radios in order to communicate with other coalition forces (emitter locator systems could theoretically detect transitions via conventional radios). However, given the deactivated state of Assad's IADS, the use of radios likely wouldn't be a significant issue.

As for the selection of targets, David Axe and Robert Beckhusen recently wrote how US signals intelligence assets have provided invaluable information to US forces in Iraq (and likely in Syria as well preceding the American air strikes).

Related Articles: 

The Benefits of Stealth and Situational Awareness
The Uncertain Future of America's Raptors - Part I Introduction
The Uncertain Future of America's Raptors - Part II Adaptations to Budget Cuts
The Uncertain Future of America's Raptors - Part III Upgrades



Image 2: F-22 pilot refuels from a KC-135 tanker after participating in operations over Syria. Notably, the pilot has an American flag in the cockpit, a customary practice during real combat operations (Cenciotti, 2014). Image Credit: USAF

Sources 

  1. http://breakingdefense.com/2014/09/f-22s-used-in-syria-strikes-right-force-right-time-say-analysts/
  2. http://aviationweek.com/defense/f-22-s-takes-first-shot-against-ground-not-air-target
  3. http://www.voanews.com/content/us-arab-partners-air-strikes-islamic-state-syria/2459099.html
  4. http://www.defensenews.com/article/20140923/DEFREG04/309230036/Mideast-Countries-Play-Major-Role-Islamic-State-Strikes
  5. http://www.defensenews.com/article/20140923/DEFREG04/309230034/Analysis-Long-Road-F-22-s-First-Combat-Mission
  6. http://theaviationist.com/2014/09/23/f-22-debut-over-syria/
  7. http://theaviationist.com/2014/04/01/f-22-not-deploying-near-russia/
  8. http://theaviationist.com/2014/09/23/f-22-isis-compound/
  9. http://www.defensenews.com/article/20140922/DEFREG04/309220020/US-Begins-Airstrikes-Islamic-State-Targets-Syria
  10. http://www.defensenews.com/interactive/article/20140923/DEFREG04/309230031/U-S-Airstrikes-Pound-Militant-Groups-Syria
  11. https://medium.com/war-is-boring/stealth-fighters-make-combat-debut-as-u-s-bombs-syria-aa60258f73f5?source=latest&amp
  12. http://news.yahoo.com/u-military-releases-video-f-22-strike-against-215023884.html
  13. http://foxtrotalpha.jalopnik.com/the-f-22-raptor-finally-bloodies-its-talons-in-attack-o-1637984159
  14. http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/headlines/2014/09/f-22-raptor-carried-us-flag-on-maiden-combat-mission-into-syria/ 

Wednesday, September 17, 2014

Japan's Domestic Stealth Fighter Ambitions - Assessment of the Proposed F-3


Image 1: ATD-X aircraft

In June Japan's Technical Research and Development Institute (TRDI) developed ATD-X was first unveiled to the public. Japan initially launched the program as part of an effort to persuade the United States to export the F-22 Raptor which was banned for export by Congress in 2004 (Axe, 2011). However, Japan currently has three principal uses for the ATD-X: a testbed for the development of counter-stealth technologies, to assist in the development of both fifth fighter technologies in tandem with the sixth generation i3 concept in an attempt to gain access to co-development of the next sixth generation American fighter program, and - if Japan cannot gain co-development rights - then proceed with a domestically produced sixth generation F-3 aircraft (Perrett, 2014). Former defense minister Onodera has indicated Japan will decide whether to proceed with domestic production in 2018 upon reviewing a potential partnership with the United States. The most probable outcome will likely be similar to the following:

  • The United States will rebuff the Japanese offer for sixth generation co-development 
  • Japan will in turn proceed with its domestic development program under significant diplomatic pressure from the United States to terminate the program
  • Japan's low defense budget and limited defense aerospace industry will either force Japan to cancel the program after few years at which point: 
    • The US will likely attempt to co-opt Japan with an offer for a much more limited role in the American program sixth generation program than originally desired by the Japanese Government (to eliminate competition in the fighter export market) 
  •  OR Japan will continue with development of the F-3 despite the high opportunity costs with only a few dozen F-3 aircraft produced    
While the plausible series of events described above are certainly bleak from Japan's perspective, one cannot reasonably conclude Japan's defense aerospace industry could mass produce a sixth generation aircraft by 2030. Not only will the inherent limitation's of Japan's own defense industry constrain the development of the F-3, but also the United States will exert immense diplomatic pressure on the Government of Japan to cancel the F-3 program. Part I will detail the prospects for the joint development of a sixth generation aircraft between the United States and Japan as well as examining the inherent weakness of Japan's defense aerospace industry. Part II will examine how the US will pressure the Government of Japan should it continue with the development of the F-3, how the F-3 program would unfold if unhindered by the US and given budgetary priority by the Japanese Government, and the strategic impact the F-3 would have in the Asia-Pacific region.


 Prospects for an American Partnership



Image 2: F-X sixth generation fighter concept by Lockheed Martin

Japan has indicated a preference for American co-development route over the domestic production and development route. However, it is unlikely the United States will allow Japan to participate in the development of either the USAF F-X or USN F/A-XX sixth generation fighter programs at an early stage (Japan is likely soliciting entry in the USAF program). The first USAF sixth generation aircraft will be a high-end air dominance platform designed to replace the F-22 Raptor while the USN intends to procure a sixth generation replacement to the F/A-18E Super Hornet; both services aim to field the aircraft in the early 2030s.

In a similar manner as the Raptor, the first USAF sixth generation aircraft will incorporate numerous sensitive and revolutionary technologies not initially available in other platforms. Given the sensitivity of the technologies incorporated in its design, its unclear if the US would be willing to allow for co-development - or even export - given the recent history with the F-22 program. While the USAF and USN are in the process of defining which key technologies will constitute sixth generation capabilities, the US maintains a competitive advantage in all of the most likely technologies including: variable-cycle engines, gallium nitride based radar arrays, directed energy weapons, multi-frequency band stealth, "artificial intelligence" (more likely a form of data management software), and limited "self-healing" capabilities such as the vehicle system network (VSN) in use on the F-35.

It remains unclear, from the American perspective, to what extent the US could benefit from Japanese participation in development of the F-X aircraft. The US maintains a comparative advantage in all the aforementioned technologies a result of its significantly greater Research Development Test and Evaluation (RDT&E) budget which is $63 billion for FY 2014, larger than Japan's entire $49 billion  FY 2015 defense budget.


Image 3: Lockheed Martin Falcon 10 test aircraft equipped with Aero-Adaptive/Aero-Optic Beam Control (ABC). Solid state lasers have made substantial advancements in recent years under US Navy, Air Force, and DARPA programs. Directed energy weapons such as Lockheed Martin's ABC have the potential to intercept enemy missiles and aircraft. The 150 kilowatt High Energy Liquid Laser Area Defense System (HELLADS) could also be employed against ground targets. Image Credit: Air Force Research Laboratory

While Japan is certainly a stalwart ally of the United States, Washington has credible reasons to be protective of the American defense industry. Even if Japan were unable to be in a position to credibly compete with the United States in arms exports, which is largely the case as detailed in the next section, Japan has had several incidents of leaks related to sensitive US systems. In 2007, a Japanese officer was arrested after leaking radar and transmission frequencies for the US Aegis system. The incident prompted the US to temporarily halt shipments of components related to upgrading Japan's Kongo-class destroyers. The US concern over the limited ability of Japan to retain US sensitive technological secrets promoted Japan to enact a new state secrets law in 2013 which details harsh new penalties for those who leak classified information (Lucy, 2013). While the new law will assuage Washington's concerns to some extent, its unlikely Washington will fundamentally shift its position toward co-development (counter intelligence remains a concern, particularly against Chinese intelligence services).

The US has only shown a consistent willingness to co-develop systems that incorporate technologies already in use by the US military such as the SM-3 Raytheon-Mitsubishi partnership or to some extent the F-35 (though largely co-production rather than foreign assistance in early R&D work with the exception of BAE Systems and Elbit Systems). In summary, the US Government remains wary of the possibility that sensitive US produced technology could be obtained by foreign companies and nations from both an economic and national security perspective and it is unlikely that concern will change in future decades.


Limitations of Japan's Domestic Defense Aerospace Industry 


Image 4: Japanese F-2 fighter 

Upon being denied entry into the American F-X program, Japan will likely pursue a domestically produced 6th generation aircraft. However, the inherent limitation's of Japan's defense industry will either result in the eventual termination of the F-3 program or a limited production run of only a few dozen aircraft. The Japanese defense aerospace industry has been unable to cost effectively design and produce military aircraft in large quantities for the last three decades. Until recently, Japan's self imposed arms export ban limited sales to the domestic market. Furthermore, Japan's annual defense budget for the last decade has equaled approximately 1% of GDP with the FY 2015 budget allocating $49 billion toward defense. The result of comparatively low military budgets combined with limited production orders from the domestic market has historically resulted in Japanese defense aerospace firms being unable to achieve economies of scale production (Axe, 2011).

The net effect being Japanese domestically produced fighter aircraft are much more expensive than their international equivalents and few Japanese aircraft are produced. For example, the flyaway cost for a Mitsubishi F-2 is $136 million in 2014 dollars, more than three times the cost of the F-16C Block 50/52+ from which the design was based and more than the flyaway cost for a current F-35A under the recent LRIP 7 contract (Defense Industry Daily & Butler, 2014). While the F-2 incorporates modest improvements over the F-16 C Block 50/52+ design, the improvements are not proportionate to increase in cost. Similarly, Japanese produced F-35s are expected to cost 27% more than their American manufactured equivalents due to the incorporation of Japanese made components (Defense Industry Daily, 2014).

The Government of Japan has been consistently willing to support its domestic defense industry at the cost of potentially greater defense capabilities, which would result from the deployment of more numerous imported systems, and will likely continue to do so. Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Ishikawajima-Harima Heavy Industries, and other domestic defense firms have strong ties with both the Japanese Diet and are the source of tens of thousands of jobs within the Japanese economy. However, the development of the F-3 will cost more than any other Japanese aerospace program to date.



Image 5:Japan is in the process of upgrading its fourth generation fighter force. License built F-15Js and F-15DJs compose the majority of the Japanese self defense force;s (JSDF) fighter aircraft fleet with 223 in Japan's inventory. Japan's fleet of F-15s are undergoing mid-life upgrades which include improvements to the central computer, electronic counter-measures system, radar, Integrated Electronic Warfare System (IEWS), and the inclusion of new weapon systems (IHS Janes, 2013).

General Hideyuki Yoshioka estimates the total program cost will be $100 billion over the service lives of the aircraft, assuming a few dozen are produced (Axe, 2011). Richard Aboulafia, an aviation expert from the Teal Group, estimates the development costs alone for the F-3 program will be at least $20 billion. The enormous funds required to develop, produce, and maintain the F-3 are incongruent with Japan's aggregate defense expenditures. In order for the full production and development of the F-3 to be plausible, Japan cannot continue to spend merely 1% of its GDP on defense without massive cuts to other Japanese weapon programs.


Sources


  1. Japan to encourage universities to develop military technologies, Jon Grevatt, 2014. http://www.janes.com/article/42535/japan-to-encourage-universities-to-develop-military-technologies
  2. ATD-X Emerges Amid Japanese Fighter Choices, Bradley Perrett, 2014. http://aviationweek.com/defense/atd-x-emerges-amid-japanese-fighter-choices
  3. Japanese MoD denies reports of 2015 first flight for ATD-X prototype, Kosuke Takahashi, 2014.                                                                                                                                                 http://www.janes.com/article/41815/japanese-mod-denies-reports-of-2015-first-flight-for-atd-x-prototype
  4. Japan's indigenous stealth jet prototype 'to fly this year', Kosuke Takahashi, 2014. http://www.janes.com/article/36713/japan-s-indigenous-stealth-jet-prototype-to-fly-this-year
  5. Japan to develop stealth-detecting long-range radar, Kosuke Takahashi, 2014. http://www.janes.com/article/27447/japan-to-develop-stealth-detecting-long-range-radar
  6. Onodera says Japan may buy more F-35s 'if price is right', Kosuke Takahashi & James Hardy, 2014.                                                                                                                                   http://www.janes.com/article/40622/onodera-says-japan-may-buy-more-f-35s-if-price-is-right
  7. F-35 Deal Targets Unit Cost Below $100 Million, Amy Butler, 2013. http://aviationweek.com/defense/f-35-deal-targets-unit-cost-below-100-million
  8. Japanese MoD Budget, 2014.                                                                                                           http://www.mod.go.jp/e/d_budget/pdf/260130.pdf
  9. UCLASS Requirements Shifted To Preserve Navy’s Next Generation Fighter, Dave Majumdar & Sam LaGrone, 2014.                                                                                                           http://news.usni.org/2014/07/31/uclass-requirements-shifted-preserve-navys-next-generation-fighter
  10. Air Force Seeks Laser Weapons for Next Generation Fighters, Dave Majumdar, 2013.  http://news.usni.org/2013/11/20/air-force-seeks-laser-weapons-next-generation-fighters
  11. Navy’s Next Fighter Likely to Feature Artificial Intelligence, Dave Majumdar, 2014.  http://news.usni.org/2014/08/28/navys-next-fighter-likely-feature-artificial-intelligence
  12. Next Generation Engine Work Points to Future U.S. Fighter Designs, Dave Majumdar, 2013.   http://news.usni.org/2014/06/23/next-generation-engine-work-points-future-u-s-fighter-designs
  13. GaN Revolution, Dave Majumdar, 2011. http://www.defensenews.com/article/20110228/DEFFEAT01/102280305/GaN-Revolution
  14. Israel Sells Arms To China, U.S. Says, Michael R. Gordon, 1993 http://www.nytimes.com/1993/10/13/world/israel-sells-arms-to-china-us-says.html
  15. Report: Israel Passes U.S. Military Technology to China, Bryant Jordan, 2013. http://defensetech.org/2013/12/24/report-israel-passes-u-s-military-technology-to-china/
  16. Japan Aims To Launch F-3 Development In 2016-17, Bradley Perrett, 2012.   http://aviationweek.com/awin/japan-aims-launch-f-3-development-2016-17
  17. Japan military school raided over Aegis data leak, Martyn Williams, 2007. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/05/21/AR2007052100710.html
  18. Intelligence: Japan Plugs Aegis Leak, Stragegy Page, 2007. http://www.strategypage.com/htmw/htintel/20071216.aspx
  19. Japan's State Secrets Law: Hailed By U.S., Denounced By Japanese, Lucy Craft, 2013. http://www.npr.org/blogs/parallels/2013/12/31/258655342/japans-state-secrets-law-hailed-by-u-s-denounced-by-japanese
  20. Japan’s New Fighter a $100-Billion Program?, Kyle Mizokami, 2011. http://www.warisboring.com/2011/03/10/japans-new-fighter-a-100-billion-dollar-program/
  21. DARPA Plans to Arm Drones With Missile-Blasting Lasers, Allen McDuffee, 2011. http://www.wired.com/2013/11/drone-lasers/ 
  22. Navy to Test-Fire DARPA's Hellads Laser, Graham Warwick, 2013. http://aviationweek.com/blog/navy-test-fire-darpas-hellads-laser 
  23. DARPA testing planes with a 'Star Wars'-style laser cannon, Eric Mack, 2014. http://www.cnet.com/news/darpa-is-testing-planes-with-a-star-wars-style-laser-cannon/ 
  24. Defense Industry Daily, 2014.                                                                                                         http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/darpas-abc-of-airborne-lasers-09164/
  25. F-15J, Global Security, 2011.                                                                                                         http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/japan/f-15j.htm
  26. Japan Responds to Regional Threats With Air Power Boost, Chris Pocock , 2014. http://www.ainonline.com/aviation-news/singapore-air-show/2014-02-12/japan-responds-regional-threats-air-power-boost 
  27. Lockheed's New Laser Super Turret Could Change Air Combat Forever, Tyler Rogoway, 2014. http://foxtrotalpha.jalopnik.com/lockheeds-new-laser-super-turret-could-change-air-comba-1635210849

Monday, September 1, 2014

Resurgent Russia Part II

[UPDATE: The next article, Japan's Domestic Stealth Fighter Ambitions - Assessment of the Proposed F-3, will be delayed but will be released as soon as possible. Work and school life routinely take priority and I apologize for the delay. Thank you for your patience.]

Client States - Objectives in the Near Abroad


Image 1: Graphic of the conflict in Ukraine. Russian backed separatists launched a counter-offensive against Ukrainian forces in late August 2014 and are believed to be heading for Mariupol. Image Credit: Swedish Defense Ministry

"Much in Russian foreign policy today is based on a consensus that crystallized in the early 1990s. Emerging from the rubble of the Soviet collapse, this consensus ranges across the political spectrum — from pro-Western liberals to leftists and nationalists. It rests on three geostrategic imperatives: that Russia must remain a nuclear superpower, a great power in all facets of international activity, and the hegemon — the political, military, and economic leader — of its region. This consensus marks a line in the sand, beyond which Russia cannot retreat without losing its sense of pride or even national identity. [emphasis mine] It has proven remarkably resilient, surviving post-revolutionary turbulence and the change of political regimes from Boris Yeltsin to Vladimir Putin". - Leon Aron, 2013

The current crisis in Ukraine is often discussed as the latest in a series of events responsible for escalating tensions between Russia and the West which were marked by extensive economic ties and varying degrees of political cooperation only one year prior. Furthermore, President Vladimir Putin is often described as irrational given his refusal to arm Ukrainian separatists destitute the enormous financial and political costs incurred by Russia as a  result of Western sanctions (Judah, 2014). However, a more comprehensive view of the crisis in Ukraine indicates Russia's current actions are consistent with the Russian Federation's long held post-Soviet foreign policy aims and Russian objectives in Ukraine would not have been significantly impacted by more assertive EU or American actions. Maintaining significant influence in Ukraine is a non-negotiable Russian foreign policy interest, a Western aligned Ukraine with possible future EU and NATO membership would have been intolerable.

"'Coercion requires finding a bargain, arranging for him to be better off doing what we want—worse off not doing what we want—when he takes the threatened penalty into account.' However irrational it might seem to the rest of the world, there is no feasible penalty that makes the desired Western outcome in Ukraine acceptable to Moscow." - Samuel Charap, 2014

In relative terms, Russia's interests in Ukraine vastly outweigh American and EU interests and Russia is subsequently willing to go to extreme lengths to pursue what it considers a critical component to its national security policy - establishing Russian regional dominance. No amount of Western punitive action short of war can realistically alter Russian objectives in Ukraine including the often discussed minimalist provisions of arms, intelligence support, etc. that the West could provide to the Ukrainian Government. Russia's support of the separatists and the annexation of Crimea must be put into the context that the ousting of former President Viktor Yanukovych was a major blow to Russian interests in Ukraine and the new pro-Western elected Government threatened long-term Russian influence. The annexation of Crimea and the continued support of Ukrainian Separatists are frantic attempts to secure long term Russian influence in reaction to the rapid deterioration of Russia's regional posture.  



Image 2: Russian Black Sea Fleet stationed at Sevastopol Crimea. Image Credit AP 

In order to facilitate continued Russian influence in Ukraine inspite of the currently hostile central Ukrainian Government, Moscow desires a federated Ukraine in which eastern provinces would be semi-autonomous and more sympathetic to Russian interests (Gates, 2014). Furthermore, the continued support of armed separatists based in Lugansk and Donetsk effectively prohibits Ukraine from NATO membership; NATO does not admit new member states with ongoing territorial disputes (Vandiver, 2014). The annexation of Crimea secures Russian access to the Mediterranean from Sevastopol and ensues Ukraine will be unable to achieve energy independence. When Russia annexed Crimea, it gained access to 36,000 square miles of territory in the Black Sea adjacent to Crimea which are rich in natural gas deposits.

"Now not only does Russia now control that, Ukraine does not. That was potentially the secret to greater energy independence for Ukraine somewhere down the road. That's now not going to be possible. So, it's kind of been a win-win for Putin in that respect, both security and economically. And so I think -- I think it'll be very tough for a Ukrainian government to move westward given the economic leverage that Russia has." - Robert Gates, 2014

Net Effect of Russian Actions  on Russia's Strategic Outlook

While Vladimir Putin has secured long term Russian influence over Ukraine, the Russian Federation's aggregate strategic position in Eurasia has largely been compromised as a result. Many post-Soviet states such as Moldova, Georgia, and Kazakhstan have openly voiced concern over Russian actions in Ukraine and have reinvigorated their efforts to increase diplomatic ties with the United States. While US options for realistically altering Russian involvement in Ukraine in the short term is limited, the US has been presented with significant long term opportunities to shore up diplomatic and military relationships with other post-Soviet States with the objective being to contest Russian regional hegemony.

"[many post-Soviet states] had taken risks, done things that were of politically unpopular to support the United States whether that was sending forces to Afghanistan and Iraq whether that was signing energy deals favoring US allies, and in response the US wasn't doing enough to protect them either diplomatically or militarily...The ability of Russia's effort to court these states will have a lot to do with how they perceive US interest and commitment to them. Many would like to see a deeper security relationship with the United States including: weapon sales, temporary rotations of forces, and training. Even countries that have very different relations amongst themselves like Azerbaijan and Armenia both seem to have an interest in a higher level of US military support for the other as long as it does not disrupt the balance...The issue for a lot of these countries is that they see they have entered a new world with Russia and they are very much looking to the United States and NATO but toward the United States in particular for some kind of leadership to reassure them that this new world is not going to fundamentally threaten their sovereignty and independence."  - Jeffrey Mankoff, 2014


Image 3: US F-16's prior to training mission at Lask Air Base, Poland. Image Credit: DOD 2014. 

Russian actions in Ukraine have not only reinvigorated the efforts of neighboring countries to pursue ties with the US but also it has severely weakened the Russian economy. While the $100 to $200 billion dollars in capital flight as a result of Western sanctions have certainly contributed toward Russia's downgraded future economic outlook, Russia's self imposed food ban against the US, EU, and Australia is likely to inflict even greater damage toward the Russian economy; Inflation is expected to rise to 7-8% if sanctions continue into 2015 (Filatova, 2014). Russia's planned $720 billion dollar military modernization program through 2020 has only been made possible as a result of continued economic growth over the last decade.

In summary, the crisis in Ukraine has actually constrained Russia's ability to assert regional hegemony rather than promoting it. Members of the United States Congress continue to lament at the relative inaction of the Obama Administration with respect to Ukraine but Putin has clearly established the entity that can inflict the greatest possible damage toward Russia's future strategic prospects is Russia itself. An appropriate response from the United States, detailed in Part III, must be cognizant of the self defeating nature of Russia's Ukraine policy and the desire of many post-Soviet states to pursue closer ties with the United States. 


Author's Note: Future articles will be published on a weekly basis unless otherwise noted (generally every Monday or Tuesday). 

Sources (In addition to Part I)

  1. Ukraine’s Army Slogs Through the Merciless Donbass - Blood, borscht and BTRs, Robert Beckhusen, 2014.                                                                                                                             https://medium.com/war-is-boring/ukraines-army-slogs-through-the-merciless-donbass-9634b9a371d1 
  2. Ukrainian military moves to endgame, Tim Ripley, 2014.                                                                      http://www.janes.com/article/42233/ukrainian-military-moves-to-endgame
  3. The "Near-Abroad" Factor: Why Putin Stands Firm over Ukraine, Hilary Appel, 2014. http://nationalinterest.org/feature/the-near-abroad-factor-why-putin-stands-firm-over-ukraine-10517
  4. Special Operations: All Glory To The 45th For Conquering Crimea, 2014. https://www.strategypage.com/htmw/htsf/20140325.aspx
  5. Analysis: Crimea intervention - The increasing sophistication of Russia's military resurgence, Tim Ripley, and Bruce Jones, 2014.                                                                                                         http://www.janes.com/article/36143/update-analysis-crimea-intervention-the-increasing-sophistication-of-russia-s-military-resurgence
  6. Is NATO Back? That Depends on Germany, Emily Cadei, 2014.                                                       http://www.ozy.com/fast-forward/is-nato-back-that-depends-on-germany/33475.article
  7. Is NATO a Bulwark in Need of Reform or a Relic?, Hanna Kozlowska , 2014.                                 http://op-talk.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/08/27/is-nato-a-bulwark-in-need-of-reform-or-a-relic/?_php=true&_type=blogs&_php=true&_type=blogs&partner=rssnyt&emc=rss&_r=1
  8. How NATO Could Confront the Putin Doctrine, David Francis, 2014. http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:http://thecable.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2014/08/26/how_nato_could_confront_the_putin_doctrine_petro_poroshenko_belarus
  9. The 'Putin Doctrine' And The Real Reason For Russian-American Conflict, Mark Adomanis, 2013.  http://www.forbes.com/sites/markadomanis/2013/03/13/the-putin-doctrine-and-the-real-reason-for-russian-american-conflict/
  10. Russia Lies About Invading Ukraine as It Invades Ukraine, Anna Nemtsova, 2014. http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2014/08/28/russian-moms-denounce-putin-s-not-so-secret-ukraine-invasion.html
  11. NATO: These new satellite images show Russian troops in and around Ukraine, Dan Lamothe, 2014. http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2014/08/28/nato-these-new-satellite-images-show-russian-troops-in-and-around-ukraine/
  12. Why Obama's Coercion Strategy in Ukraine Will Fail, Samuel Charap, 2014. http://nationalinterest.org/feature/why-obamas-coercion-strategy-ukraine-will-fail-11006
  13. Arm Ukraine or Surrender, Ben Judah, 2014.                                                                                      http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/01/opinion/arm-ukraine-or-surrender.html?partner=rss&emc=rss&_r=0
  14. Putin's Goal for Ukraine, Nikolas K. Gvosdev, 2014.                                                                          http://nationalinterest.org/feature/putins-goal-ukraine-11170 
  15. Kissinger on Russia's global integration, 2014. http://cnnpressroom.blogs.cnn.com/2014/05/11/kissinger-on-russias-global-integration/ 
  16. Food imports ban backfires on Russia's economy, Irina Filatova, 2014.                                               http://www.dw.de/food-imports-ban-backfires-on-russias-economy/a-17888880 
  17. Putin’s new model army, The Economist, 2014.                                                                                  http://www.economist.com/news/europe/21602743-money-and-reform-have-given-russia-armed-forces-it-can-use-putins-new-model-army 
  18. Polish MiGs deploy as NATO steps up air defenses, Bartosz Glowacki, 2014. http://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/polish-migs-deploy-as-nato-steps-up-air-defences-398747/
  19. The Putin Doctrine Russia's Quest to Rebuild the Soviet State, Leon Aron, 2013.  http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/139049/leon-aron/the-putin-doctrine
  20. NATO rejects Russia’s ‘hollow denials’ of Ukraine intervention, John Vandiver, 2014.  http://www.stripes.com/news/nato-rejects-russia-s-hollow-denials-of-ukraine-intervention-1.300593

Tuesday, August 26, 2014

Resurgent Russia - The New US-Russia Relationship


Image 1: Vladimir Putin and Dmitry Medvedev shortly after the annexation of Crimea 

“...we in the West, and in the United States in particular, dramatically underestimated the degree of humiliation on the part of the Russians with the collapse, not just of the Soviet Union which is a relatively recent phenomenon historically, but the collapse of the Russian Empire, a thousand years in the building…the humiliation of the collapse of the Russian empire, he and others like him, I think, have been determined from the beginning to restore Russia as a world power, as a force to be reckoned with, as a thousand year old empire.” – Former Director of the CIA & Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates 2014

Since the crisis in Ukraine, the United States has struggled to adjust toward a new more assertive Russia. In a recent event at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence Robert Vickers explained that monitoring “Russian Revanchism” is now the third highest priority among US intelligence services behind thwarting terrorism and monitoring the Syrian Civil War. 1 Vickers explained that Russian Revanchism is a term not limited to the current crisis in Ukraine as the intelligence community (IC) is also expanding its surveillance against Russian activities in a broader strategic context.

Although many Western policy makers are becoming increasingly aware Russia cannot be counted on as a “responsible stakeholder” or partner nation within the international community, few comprehend the extent in which Russian and Western interests are incompatible in Ukraine. In order to formulate an effective foreign policy response toward Russia, Western leaders must understand Russian objectives in both in Ukraine and within a broader global context in conjunction with associated developments in Russian strategic thinking and methodology. Part I will outline Russia's objective of maintaining nuclear deterrence against the United States and Part II will discuss Russia's attempts to establish hegemony in the near abroad; the two aforementioned objectives debatably constitute the most important Russian foreign policy objectives. An understanding of Russian foreign policy objectives will be instrumental toward the formation of an effective Western response highlighted in Part III. 

Nuclear Deterrence



Image 2: Russian Borei-class nuclear ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) Vladimir Monomakh

"The first great achievement - greatest achievement, of the Soviet Union was the defeat of Nazi Germany in World War II. The second greatest achievement was achieving nuclear parity with the United States in the early 1970s. It is this achievement that is the most important legacy, from the standpoint of military security - clearly, that was bequeathed to the Russian Federation. And it has assumed greater significance as a result of greater conventional deterioration over the last twenty years...maintaining strategic stability, i.e. parity, or more to the point preventing the United States, or anyone else for that matter, from attaining first strike capability is at the crux, at the core [of Russian national security policy]." - Andrew C. Kuchins, 2014

Russia's role as the only nuclear power on near equal footing with the United States dictates how Russian leaders perceive themselves and has had profound impacts on Russia's national security policy in the post-Cold War era. The Russian Federation continues to deploy and modernize its nuclear arsenal in a manner consistent with of the Cold War principles. The fear of a "bolt out of the blue" nuclear first strike by the United States continues to drive Russia's prioritization of its nuclear modernization programs over its conventional arsenal in order to maintain a credible second strike capability against the United States (Murdock, 2014). The more than 60% increase in defense spending under Vladimir Putin has enabled Russia to field and develop the: Borei-class SSBNs, RSM-56 Bulava submarine launched ballistic missile (SLBM), R-29RMU2 Layner SLBM, and RS-24 Yars road mobile intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). In contrast, the United States has largely been content with minimal service life extension programs to its two to three decade old nuclear arsenal.

Current US strategic planners do not devote a great deal of time generating first and second nuclear strike scenarios with offensive and defensive exchange rates against Russia. Conversely, the Russian Federation devotes considerable resources toward mapping out nuclear deployment strategies and structuring with respect to US nuclear exchanges. As Clark Murdock from CSIS explained, "The Russian's still believe the nuclear balance matters in a way that we Americans do not; They do these calculations". Murdock cited a recent study done by Dean Wilkening of RAND which illustrates the type of analysis routinely conducted by the Russian defense establishment. Wilkening's analysis, Strategic Stability Between the United States and Russia, examined the probable current offensive and defensive nuclear exchange rates between the US and Russia in a manner consistent with Cold War studies conducted by both the US and Soviet Union.



Image 3: US nuclear exchange rates against Russia in a first strike scenario. Image Credit: RAND

Wilkening concluded that a US nuclear first strike against the Russian Federation would leave 170 operable Russian nuclear weapons capable of reaching the contiguous United States (CONUS), the 48 connected states, while a Russian first strike against the US would leave 550 operable US nuclear weapons capable of reaching Russia. Russia is comparatively more vulnerable than the United States in a first strike scenario as less survivable land based missiles occupy a comparatively larger percentage of its nuclear arsenal when compared to the US which primary relies upon its more survivable but expensive SSBNs. Furthermore, the US deploys more nuclear weapons on a day to day alert status than Russia which mitigates US first strike vulnerability (Murdock, 2014).

When US anti-ballistic missile (ABM) systems are added to the scenario, Russia's number of nuclear weapons capable of hitting CONUS is reduced by 80 warheads to a total of 90 warheads and the number of survivable US nuclear weapons after a Russian first strike rises to 665.

"Nationwide ballistic missile defense, even one of relatively limited size, has two different effects on strategic stability between the United States and Russia. First, such a defense can strengthen deterrence by complicating Russia’s counterforce first strikes and denying Russian limited attack options (to the extent they are part of Russian war plans). Second, they can weaken Russia’s nuclear deterrent by reducing the size of
its secure second strike. This second effect is the principal concern that Russian officials have cited repeatedly regarding a limited U.S. homeland ballistic missile defense." - Wilkening, 2014


Image 4: By 2019 the US will field 44 Ground-Based Interceptors (GBIs) pictured above which have a demonstrated 53% intercept rate during tests. The Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system is the only US ABM designed to fully defeat ICBMS in the mid-course phase of their flight path, the SM-III to some extent has mid-course capability, rather than the lower altitude systems which attempt to intercept in the terminal phase e.g. the Patriot PAC-3 and THAAD.

The current disparity between the number of survivable US and Russian warheads, 550 and 170 respectively, which is further pronounced - to a debatable degree - after US ABM, is significantly greater than the relative survivable warhead inventories between the US and USSR during the Cold War (Wilkening, 2014). Given its comparatively more limited second strike capability, Russia believes it is vital that it reach parity with the US (Murdock, 2014). Wilkening is fully cognizant of the shortcomings of US ABM technology in his analysis but as both Wilkening and Murdock emphasize, the distinction between Russian perceptions and reality is crucial. Ultimately, if the Russian leadership fervently believes US ABM technology is capable, they will continue to plan accordingly despite the stark reality that the Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GBD) system and other US ABM systems were never designed to thwart a full scale nuclear exchange with Russia (Missile Defense Agency, 2014).

Similarly, 90 nuclear warheads would constitute a mortal blow against the United States and its nuclear armed allies but the distinction between Russian perceptions, that its nuclear arsenal would be sufficiently compromised after a US first strike and ABM defense, and reality is worth emphasizing. The United States Government cannot assume Russian leaders will behave in a manner consistent with actual US capabilities given that Russian leaders have consistently acted on different set of assumptions regarding US capabilities. Therefore, the US Government must take into account Russian perceptions and the perceptions of its allies when it decides to alter the nuclear arsenal, an objective assessment of required capabilities alone is insufficient to determining if further nuclear reductions are prudent.

Author's Note: Part II, which will detail Russia's attempts to establish hegemony in post-Soviet states, will be published week of September 1st.

Sources


  1. Russian and Chinese Assertiveness Poses New Foreign Policy Challenges, Robert Gates & Council on Foreign Relations, 2014.                                                                               http://www.cfr.org/defense-and-security/russian-chinese-assertiveness-poses-new-foreign-policy-challenges/p33005
  2. An Assessment of Russian Defense Capabilities and Security Strategy, Paul N. Schwartz, Clark A Murdock, Andrew C. Kuchins, and Jeffrey A. Mankoff, 2014.                     http://csis.org/multimedia/video-assessment-russian-defense-capabilities-and-security-strategy
  3. Strategic Stability Between the United States and Russia, Dean Wilkening, 2014. http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/corporate_pubs/CP700/CP765/RAND_CP765.pdf
  4. Missile Defense: Next Steps for the USA’s GMD, Defense Industry Daily, 2014. http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/3979m-next-step-or-last-step-for-gmd-05229/
  5. Backgrounder - Missile Defense, Jonathan Masters, 2014.                               http://www.cfr.org/missile-defense/ballistic-missile-defense/p30607
  6. USDI Vickers’ Top Threats: Terrorists, Syria, Russian ‘Revanchism’, Colin Clark, 2014.  http://breakingdefense.com/2014/06/usdi-vickers-top-threats-terrorists-syria-russian-revanchism/


1 Remarks made by Vickers at CSIS predate the capture of Mosul by ISIL and US air strikes in Iraq.

Tuesday, August 5, 2014

August Blog Updates & News


Author's Note: The blog has undergone some organizational changes since the last update to facilitate easier access to archived articles via the new "Blog Articles By Topic" tab in addition to some minor visual rearrangements. Ideas on additional blog improvements are always welcome. As per the routine monthly blog update, planned or upcoming articles are detailed below. A list of recommended articles is subsequently provided.

Upcoming/Planned Articles



Image Credit: Morten Morland, The Times

(1) Resurgent Russia: The Future of US-Russian Relations - The Western response to the seizure of Crimea and the backing of Ukrainian separatist forces has been lackluster at best. Western responses have varied from merely denouncing Putin as a "thug" to targeted and severely limited US-EU economic sanctions. The reoccurring trend being few in the West, at least as reported by media sources, understand Russian intentions within Ukraine and Russia's broader strategic considerations. Only by understanding Russian objectives and Russia's strategic reasoning can the US formulate a comprehensive foreign policy response toward a new resurgent Russia.

(2) The American Approach Part IV: Countering Foreign 5th Generation Threats - Within a few years both China and Russia will deploy fifth generation fighter aircraft comparable to American fifth generation aircraft. American and allied aviators will leverage the comparative advantages of the F-35's integrated sensor and avionics suite  in conjunction with innovative new tactics and doctrines to counter probable fifth generation adversaries such as the Chengdu J-20, Shenyang J-31, and Sukhoi PAK-FA.

(3) Rebalance: The Need for an Asia-Pacific Maritime Security and Stability Initiative - As highlighted by The Rebalance - Deterrence in the Asia-Pacific, US efforts to deter China at both the high and low intensity conflict level are failing. The publication of recent Chinese Defense white papers emphasizing "the new situation" or "zai xin xingshi xia" reaffirms the growing confidence of China's leaders with respect to enforcing territorial claims. The United States must work in consultation with its regional allies to halt China's attempts to change the territorial status quo in the South China Sea. The author will recommend a number of comprehensive proposals to deter China at the low intensity level.

Recommended Media


Council on Foreign Relations Interview with Singapore's Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong


"The President has talked about rebalancing toward Asia and the importance of Asia toward America and we strongly support that...America has to engage in actively [in the Asia-Pacific] and you have many other issues on your agenda...but we hope that amidst all that busy platter, you remember - at least once a day, that in Asia you have many friends, many interests, and many investments"


"Defense heavyweights – including Bill Clinton’s Secretary of Defense, former defense policy chiefs to Presidents Barack Obama and George W. Bush, and the former Senate Seapower chairman – just sent over their 'stress test' of the Pentagon’s latest defense strategy to Capitol Hill. Unlike many blue ribbon commission reports, the National Defense Panel (NDP) recommendations are blunt, serious, and urgent. The panel report describes in detail the dangerous accumulation of challenges to American military power and charts a path to reverse this decline...'U.S. military superiority is not a given.' To ensure the Pentagon stays ahead of the competition, the panel recommends “an energetic program of targeted reinvestment,” a larger Navy and Air Force, and a halt to planned reductions in active duty Army end strength. They call for greater investment in ISR systems, space architecture, cyber capabilities, joint command and control, air superiority assets, long-range and precision strike capability, undersea and surface naval warfare, electric and directed energy weapons, strategic lift, and logistics."

The Three C’s of U.S. Espionage in Germany - John R. Schindler

"The bottom line is that American espionage priorities in Germany can be boiled down to the Three C’s: Counterintelligence, Counterterrorism, and Counterproliferation...it’s common knowledge that the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) and military intelligence (GRU) have as many officers, including illegals (meaning deep-cover types posing as civilians without any ties to Russia), in Germany today as they had at the height of the Cold War.West Germany’s counterintelligence record during the Cold War was frankly dismal, for many reasons. East Bloc services had no trouble penetrating West German institutions at the highest levels. To cite only some of the most famous cases: Heinz Felfe, the BND’s head of counterespionage, was revealed to be a Soviet spy in 1961, while Otto John, the very first director of the BfV, defected to East Germany in 1954, and 1974 saw the unmasking of Günter Guillaume, a top adviser to Chancellor Willy Brandt, as a spy for East Germany’s legendary Stasi....Given the extent of attention paid to Germany by the SVR and GRU, U.S. intelligence would be foolish not to be watching this closely, especially because even closely allied spy agencies seldom spill the beans about penetrations, which are embarrassing to admit"

The New Neutrality - Yuriko Koike

"In both Germany and South Korea, economic strength seems to have produced an illusion of policy independence that is opening a chasm between the two countries and their allies – a chasm that revelations of US spying, on Merkel in particular, have deepened. Germany and South Korea, however, will gain little, and risk much, if they downgrade their alliance ties in favor of commercially motivated, if unofficial, neutrality. Whatever short-term benefits they receive will be more than offset by their strategic vulnerabilities vis-à-vis Russia and China."

Carbon Fiber Clouds Hiding Naval Destroyers from Anti-Ship Missiles - Defense Update

"The US Navy has recently tested a new anti-ship missile countermeasure system using an obscurant generator prototype. The systems and tactics were tested under a variety of at-sea conditions using assets from the U.S. Army, Navy, and Air Force to evaluate how radar-absorbing, carbon-fiber clouds can prevent a missile from detecting and striking its target as part of a layered defense."

Special report - Inside Xi Jinping's purge of China's oil mandarins - David Lague, Charlie Zhu and Benjamin Kang Lim

"In a bid to isolate his rival, Xi is steadily taking down Zhou's extensive web of colleagues, political allies, relatives, staff and business associates of his family, according to people familiar with the investigation."

ANALYSIS: India's Air Force Modernization Challenge - Atul Chandra

"The modernization of the Indian air force is massive in scale and hugely expensive, but should deliver capability that will put the service at the forefront of any future conflict."

Fourth Known J-20 Prototype Makes First Flight - Richard D Fisher Jr

"The fourth known prototype of the Chengdu Aircraft Corporation (CAC) J-20 fifth-generation fighter made its first flight on the morning of 26 July, according to Chinese aviation websites...Images show that '2012' features the refinements first seen in the third prototype, '2011'. These include an undernose faceted shape to hold a future electro-optical targeting system, adjusted air intakes to aid engine air flow and clipped tips on the vertical stabilizers. The new J-20 prototype does not give any outward indication that CAC has installed an indigenous turbofan engine, despite much online speculation. The status of the J-20's intended WS-15 turbofan is not clear, and it is possible that initially deployed J-20s may use a Russian-made turbofan, perhaps an upgraded version of the Saturn AL-31 or the newer AL-117S."

Russia Cheating on Nuclear Missile Treaty - Jim Kuhnhenn

"In an escalation of tensions, the Obama administration accused Russia on Monday of conducting tests in violation of a 1987 nuclear missile treaty, calling the breach "a very serious matter" and going public with allegations that have simmered for some time...The U.S. says Russia tested a new ground-launched cruise missile, breaking the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty that President Ronald Reagan signed with Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev. Russian officials say they have looked into the allegations and consider the matter closed."